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 Modelling heat radiation essentially affects the fire resistance 
rating (FRR) of a bare hydrogen tank in bonfire test simulations 
 The use of resins with different Td for CFRP tank jackets can 
result in drastic difference in FRR. 
 Burner has a significant influence on the FRR. Burner(s) should 
be standardised.  
 Heat release rate affects FRR for the same design burner. HRR 
should be standardised.   
 The current GTR fire test protocol can result in incomparable 
results of the same storage tank in different laboratories 
around the globe.  
Lit.: V. Molkov; Progress in physical effects at Ulster, presentation April 20th ,2015 IEA HIA 
Task37, Karlsruhe (ulster.ac.uk) 
Den danske brint- og brændselscelledag 2016 
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Program EUDP  
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Projekttype Forskning   -  Journalnummer 64014-0534  
 
DTU contact: Frank Markert (fram@dtu.dk) 
The work plan and objectives of this task are designed to support the 
acceleration of safe implementation of hydrogen infrastructure 
through coordinated international collaborations and hydrogen safety 
knowledge dissemination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Development of a hydrogen safety integration model (or tool):  
A user-friendly integrated hydrogen safety model (tool) that 
facilitates system analysis and determines appropriate risk metrics. 
 Development of risk management strategies to ensure safety 
implementation of hydrogen infrastructure: 
To provide a systematic approach to determine gaps in current basic 
and applied research. 
 Collection of systems, subsystems, and components reliability (i.e., 
field failure) data and human error (HE) probabilities (i.e., human 
factors) to support quantitative risk analysis (QRA):  
To collect information on effects of components failures on hydrogen 
systems and infrastructure 
 Performance of consequence analysis to facilitate the accelerated 
adoption of hydrogen technologies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above-mentioned objectives are intended to support the 
overarching goal of enhancing safe implementation of hydrogen-based 
technologie.  
 
1. United Technologies Research Center (UTRC) USA  
2. National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) USA  
3. Department of Energy (DOE) USA  
4. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) USA  
5. HySafe Canada  
6. Technova Inc Japan 
7. Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) Germany  
8. Federal Institute Materials Research and Testing, BAM Germany  
9. University of Ulster UK  
10. Health & Safety Laboratory (HSL) UK  
11. University of Warwick UK  
12. Air Liquide France  
13. INERIS France  
14. Technical University of Denmark (DTU) Denmark  
15. University of Pisa (UniPi) Italy  
16. Tecnalia Spain  
17. EC Joint Research Center European Commission (EC)  
18. GexCon Norway  
19. University College of South East Norway Norway  
Periode: 4/2015 - 3/2018  Bevillingsår: 2014 
Egen finansiering: 0,03 mio.  Støttebeløb: 0,30 mio. 
Støtteprocent: 90%  Projektbudget: 0,33 mio. 
 
Operating Agent:  
Dr. John Khalil  (KhalilYF@UTRC.utc.com) 
Term: 2015-2018 
United Technologies Research Center (UTRC) 
411 Silver Lane, East Hartford, CT USA 
 
A number of other tools and outputs resulting form the activities 
in the sub-tasks as indicated in the orgainsational scheme are 
under development. Hereunder, a tool under development by 
DTU to integrate Human error into QRA calculations:  
 
Integration of human behavior / errors into a dynamic model of 
a hydrogen installation.  
 
Monte Carlo approach enables to model and simulate many more 
hazard scenarios including the effects of insufficient maintenance 
of e.g. detectors and evacuation. This enables to predict worst 
case scenarios opposite to the worst case assumptions made by 
risk experts. 
 Event sequences are simulated in parallel. 
 Dynamic interaction of events 
 Events taking place in one sequence change the conditions in 
the other sequences 
 Data are sampled statistically,  
 e.g. hole size, wind speed, number and position workers 
 Multiple runs (many!) are performed to extract risk numbers 
(IR, PLL, group risk) 
 Individual scenarios can be simulated graphically (animation) 
The task 37 supports a transition to a new HYDROGEN ECONOMY. 
The work is a continuation of IEA HIA tasks 19 and 32. The 
consortium has close relationships to the International 
Association HySafe and to the standardization activities according 
to TC197. 
 build–up of new safe and sustainable  infrastructure e.g. for 
safe hydrogen delivery from production site to refueling 
stations 
 Safe use of hydrogen in various kinds of applications 
 Safety standards for garages, car parks, tunnels etc.. 
 
The goal is to support an inherently safer approach to build the 
future hydrogen energy infrastructure in Denmark and 
internationally. 
 
The hydrogen infrastructure may: 
 Integrate energy supply and fuel supply infrastructures energy 
sector and transport sector 
 New hydrogen applications will develope through time, as e.g. 
hydrogen trains  as alternative for diesel trains on tracks were 
electrification  is too expensive, e.g.: 
 
A passenger train connecting two towns in Germany is the first in the 
country to run on hydrogen. The train will begin operation in December 
2017, and will run between Buxtehude, a small city, and the beach town 
Cuxhaven. Three other German states have also expressed interest in 
adopting similar projects. 
The Coradia iLint passenger train, built by Alstom in France and revealed 
this month, uses hydrogen recycled from the chemical industry to travel 
497 miles on one charge. It can run up to 87 miles per hour, storing any 
excess energy in Lithium batteries slung on the bottom of the train car. 
 
(https://www.manufacturing.net/news/2016/09/germanys-first-hydrogen-train-uses-recycled-
fuel) 
 
 
 
1. Sampling hole size & direction
2. Sampling immediate ignition, time to secure 
work place, delayed continuous and intermittent 
ignition and s tart time for delayed intermittent 
ignition 
3. If either the continuous or intermittent source 
exists, their positions in  the process area are 
sampled
4. Sample no. and pos ition of people in the 
process area
Start
1. Modelling dispersion or jet flame  if 
immediate ignition takes  p lace
2. If jet flame, modelling impact on 
people and number of people killed 
3. If delayed ignition, all who not 
escaped process area are killed
 available safe egress ion time (ASET)
STOP SIMULATION 
Evacuation finished
1. Modelling securing working places 
and escape from process area
2. Modelling reaching the muster
 required safe egression time (RSET)
Visualisation 
of release
1. Detections & alarms work or failed
2. Isolation of release
Visualisation 
of escape
HyRAM toolkit developped by Sandia National Laboratories.  
 
 A tool to do probabilistic risk assessment using fault and event 
trees as well as state-of-the –art consequence models.  
 The HyRAM toolkit integrates state-of-the-art models and data 
for assessing hydrogen safety.  
HyRAM provides a common platform for stakeholders conducting 
quantitative risk assessment and consequence analysis for hydrogen 
systems. The resulting information provides the scientific basis to 
ensure code requirements are consistent, logical, and defensible.  
 
Scenario End State Type 
Avg. 
Events/Year 
100pct Release No Ignition 0.0008 
10pct Release No Ignition 0.0012 
1pct Release No Ignition 0.0015 
0.1pct Release No Ignition 0.0050 
0.01pct Release No Ignition 0.0348 
Project details 
DTU Management Engineering - Frank Markert  - fram@dtu.dk 
BONFIRE tests and simulation by K.I.T. and University Ulster  
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Lit.: F. Markert, I. Kozine, N. J. Duijm; process Risk Assessment using Dynamic Simulation 
of Scenarios; Chemical Engineering Transactions; 48 (2016); ISBN 978-88-95608-39-6 
